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Dear Editor
I was quite pleased to see that Denis Wood took the time to respond so 
fulsomely to my letter [Denis Wood’s article Map Art CP 55], and I read his 
remarks with great interest. I think that his explanations certainly clear 
up a lot of ambiguity in the earlier article [Map Art CP54], and allow us to 
pinpoint quite precisely where Dr Wood’s argument runs off the rails. 
Clearly, the bone of this contention is what Wood has referred to as the 
mask worn by a map. He and I, as he points out, have no argument that 
the mask is the means employed by the map to connote trustworthiness. 
However, we discover from A Map Is an Image Proclaiming Its Objective 
Neutrality: A Response to Mark Denil [CP56] that Wood attempts to turn 
this circumstance, common to all maps, into a stigmata indicative of only 
certain maps; maps Wood identifies with a certain conceit. To accom-
plish this identification, he chooses to employ very narrow and carefully 
circumscribed definitions of the terms trust, trustworthiness, and map 
in order to plead for the recognition of specially privileged categories of 
maps. Unfortunately, his definition of these specially privileged catego-
ries is so imprecise as to make decidability extremely problematic, and to 
obscure the consequences of accepting his shaky thesis. Wood clearly has 
some pertinent things to say about the categories of map he chooses to 
highlight, but his tactic of subverting general theory to the make his point 
is a questionable one at best. 
I would like to explore some of the statements Dr Wood makes in his 
Response, and evaluate some of the problematic ramifications they entail. 
Early on, Wood singles out what he terms ‘sketch maps’ as maps which 
come into the world “naked”; that is, without a mask. In fact, he goes so 
far as to declare that “neither experimentally generated sketch maps nor 
sketch maps in general are maps.”(CP 56 p.10) His confidence in this ex-
clusionary declaration is based in part upon his assertion that:
People save maps. They take care of them, they horde them, they cata-
log them, they pile them in libraries. People throw sketch maps away. 
Of the huge number we might imagine has [sic] been made – that so 
many authors are so fond of describing being sketched in sand and 
snow and on scraps of paper – almost none remains. Those that haven’t 
blown away by the wind have been tossed in the waste basket. (p.10)
Now, it very much simplifies the construction of any theory if one can 
begin by setting up boundaries and definitions to carefully exclude any-
thing inconvenient; but it is difficult to believe that this criteria for defin-
ing a so-called sketch map could be workable. Does an anonymous sketch 
of a walk to the drugstore [figure 1] only become a map only because 
Gudrun saved it? Did it become a map when she included it in a catalog? 
Does it cease to be a map when I lose the catalog? Can I be certain that, 
since there are other copies which are better cared for and stored, I can 
toss a dirty and torn National Geographic map of the world in the waste 
basket without compromising its status as a map?
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Figure 1
Granted, Wood does provide other (equally problematic) criteria for 
establishing a unique category of things called sketch maps, but why is all 
this hoarding and tossing brought in at all? It can only be to obfusticate 
an already murky position. And what is that position? At this juncture 
it seems to be that Wood would like us to accept that a sketch map is a 
special sort of thing that can simultaneously function fully as a map (at 
least to Wood) while not being a map at all (at least to Wood). Still, Wood 
is reluctant to throw sketch maps away completely; he will next claim that 
they are specially privileged maps.
For Wood, so-called sketch maps are naive or innocent products; a kind 
of noble savage among maps, or a sort of Mapping Degree Zero some-
what akin to Barthes’ Writing Degree Zero. For our purposes, this is useful 
because it may allow us to see exactly where Wood would like to place 
his map / not-map boundary. In discussing the map of Neal’s Yard (figure 
5 p.11), Wood writes about how the drawing of the map was accompa-
nied by a variety winks, nods, and grunts: things Wood says “sealed” 
the map. By contrast, he denigrates the addition of a title and border as a 
“grotesque” attempt to affix a mask to the map; as an attempt to embed 
something in the graphic that had earlier been conveyed by grimaces and 
hand flapping. 
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Somewhere between these points, then, is the line Wood would draw 
between the map and the not-map (sketch map, in this case). Clearly, 
Wood had no problem with the main features of the sketch of Neal’s Yard: 
graphic figures that apparently represent features of the yard either sig-
nificant for the game or for the context of the yard, or, perhaps, features 
purely random and anecdotal. Clearly, as well, he accepted the narrative 
explanation that accompanied the sketch (the looks and gestures). Thus 
we see what Wood found to be natural, acceptable, honest, trustworthy, 
and real: certain words and gestures, and certain marks on paper up to a 
certain point and no further. Why no further? What is it about the further 
marks on the paper that violated the pure and noble wholesomeness of 
the sketch so that afterwards everything new became simply grotesque?
It is to a certain class of markings on paper that Wood objects. There is 
nothing materially different between Kelly (the author of Neal’s Yard) tell-
ing Wood that ‘this is Neal’s yard’ and Kelly writing Neal’s Yard on the pa-
per before mailing it to, say, a grandparent with a description of the game. 
Yet Wood is outraged by the very simple devices Kelly added in an effort 
to embody something of the previously verbal and gestural narrative 
into the graphic (Wood declares the devices grotesque). The reason is that 
Wood recognizes that text centered at the top of the altered sketch, and that 
framing box: he recognizes it as confidently as Jerry Falwell recognized 
the triangle on Tinky Winky’s head; this is map furniture, and (according to 
Wood) it violates sketch map virginity.
This gives us an idea of where Wood would draw his line, but it really 
doesn’t help all that much. Would a label (“Home Plate”) have violated 
the purity? How about an arrow (whether or not drawn while saying: 
“run this direction”)? What if the house in the sketch had square corners? 
Do we have to assume that in this sketch map that the relative proportions 
of the yard are wrong (or at least not quite right)? Good grief; must I tear 
this page out of CP and throw it away (People throw sketch maps away)?
Obviously, Wood is placing valuations upon the legitimacy of means. 
Kelly’s original drawn map was praised as spontaneous and naive, 
honestly “sealed” and delivered. Kelly’s attempt to add an affordance 
to interpretation that might outlast or go beyond the magical moment of 
interpersonal bonding experienced with Wood is decried. Why is there 
this sharp divide? Wood tells us that it hinges on a pretense of neutrality. 
Somehow, according to Wood, Kelly’s original work escaped pretending to 
be neutral. This is clearly nonsensical. 
There is no question about the fact that Kelly was presenting the map 
from inside a argumentative position (‘this is a context that shows the 
game’); but was Kelly insisting or admitting that the sketch was not an ob-
jective characterization of the game or the yard in question? Of course not. 
Every speaker (or map) claims objectivity, even when declaring otherwise 
(‘... in my totally biased opinion...’): the pretense remain that the speaker’s 
or map’s prejudices are arrived at and delivered honestly and objectively. 
The map in question indeed forwarded a pretense of neutrality; the pre-
tense that the world is this way, and that the map simply reported that real-
ity. This is indistinguishable from the pretense of any topographic map. 
Only a political difference remains: Wood finds Kelly’s original claim le-
gitimate and dismisses other claims; including Kelly’s later work. Appar-
ently, Wood feels that the sketch map is an honest product that arises from 
a partisan position, but that an ‘ordinary’ map is a deceptive, pretensive 
product that also arises from a partisan position. We can see that the only 
difference between the early and late markings on Kelly’s paper are the 
valuation of the legitimacy status which is assigned by Wood: a personal 
political difference, not a fundamental one.
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Obviously, Wood’s proposed boundary for the sketch map (and map / 
not-map division) is very unstable and quite undecidable in any dispas-
sionate way. This is real problem for his case. On the one hand, one would 
think that decidability of the map / not-map boundary would be criti-
cal, but on the other hand any question so radically undecidable is moot. 
Clearly, Woods’ identification of any boundary between maps and sketch 
maps (experimental or otherwise) is mistaken.
Sketch maps are, in fact, just like any maps, and they make similar 
appeals of trustworthiness as do all maps. Certainly, a sketch map is 
generally aimed at a restricted user community; one about which the 
map maker can confidently make many assumptions, and which may 
occasionally even be present to receive verbal or gestural explanations 
to supplement the lines on the paper (or in the sand, snow, etcetera). The 
map must always convince its audience of its veracity; if the sketch (map) 
had not convinced Wood that it was an attempt at a reasonable represen-
tation of Neal’s yard and a game played therein, Wood would not have 
recognized it as a map (a sketch map or otherwise). He might perhaps 
have assumed it was a doodle undertaken to occupy an active hand while 
the child described the game, but he would not have seen it as a map. If 
Kelly had been unconvinced that it was a reasonable map it would have 
been scribbled out or otherwise abandoned. But both Kelly and Wood did 
recognize Neal’s yard, and both recognized a map. 
This is what it means to recognize a map, and to recognize a map as 
trustworthy. It does not mean that one would be able to measure on it for 
purchasing fencing; it doesn’t mean that a zoning board would accept it as 
a valid plan, it doesn’t mean it is good for anything except describing the 
game in Neal’s yard to someone one could also provide with supplemen-
tal information. Its user community is sharply restricted, in part because it 
is so graphically terse.
In fact, it that very graphic terseness which is for Wood the telling ap-
peal because it makes it appear unsupported and naked (to Wood), and so 
seems (again to Wood) honest, ingenuous, and amateur.
Different maps certainly use different means to forward their appeal, 
and sometimes an argument of nonprofessional-ity is adventitious to 
employ (I may not be an expert, but...), but such a pretense is simply a rhe-
torical device. All maps are, after all, rhetorical vehicles: they all forward a 
position. One of the appeals they make to their audiences is one of its own 
competence. Wood, clearly, has been hoodwinked by the sketch map’s 
profession of honest amateurism. It is a mistake, however, to confuse an 
argument with its means of delivery, or to so privilege a particular means 
of delivery as to obfusticate its argumentative nature. Wood’s attempt to 
claim special privilege for sketch maps must be disallowed.
Later, Wood claims that there is another special category of privileged 
maps on the other side (so to speak) of the general run of maps: the Art-
Map. It is, Wood tells us, a map specially endowed with the power to 
throw off its mask and prance about naked.
In discussing this claim, Wood offers an interesting and illustrative 
comparison between Paul Eluard’s Surrealist Map and my own Vill-
cabamba-Ambaro Conservation Corridor maps. While I will refrain from 
repeating most of the very flattering things he says about the Villcabama 
maps, I would point out that he identifies them as (at least pretending to 
be) trustworthy. Eluard, on the other hand, Wood identifies as someone 
who (by virtue of his identification as a Surrealist) rejects trustworthiness 
as a virtue. It is quite clear, however, that each map is aimed straight at 
its audience and each appeals for an appropriate trust directly to its own 
audience by every means at its disposal. Each map uses every means that 
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each map’s maker knew would be recognized as a legitimate hallmark of 
trustworthiness for each intended audience.
The Villcabama map set was aimed straight at a major funding founda-
tion. To be quite blunt, it went into the woods loaded for bear, and in the 
end proved to be dead on target. There is a good deal of testimony on all 
sides acknowledging that it was these maps, as a significant component 
of a large, detailed, and persuasive request, that secured what was at that 
time the largest funding grant yet given for Andes Biodiversity conserva-
tion. Yes, indeed, the Villcabama maps wear a mask that their audience 
recognizes as connoting trustworthiness. 
The audience for the Villcabama maps had a predictable, and, one might 
say, a conventional set of criteria that for them connoted a trustworthy 
map. Surrealists, as one might expect, held a different conception of le-
gitimacy. Surrealism was a movement which looked for value in (among 
other things) the act of turning established order on its head. An apparent 
rejection of trustworthiness (or at least of the outward, accepted trappings 
and signs of trustworthiness) was how one made a trustworthy Surrealist 
work. In fact, Surrealism is an excellent example in this regard because it 
was one of the most organized of art movements: one could be expelled 
from Surrealism if one were not sufficiently, or acceptably, Surrealist. One 
cannot imagine Paul Eluard daring to show André Breton any map that 
departed less from the “colonialist maps” (p.12) than did this. One need 
only recall the career of Jean Cocteau to know the danger in seeming 
insufficiently Surreal to Breton. Obviously, Eluard knew his audience, and 
knew his context, and knew how to persuade his audience that his was 
a reasonable characterization of the Surreal world. Eluard knew how to 
make a trustworthy Surrealist object, and that is what he did.
Is Eluard’s map really all that innovative? Does it really present a 
wholly new vision ungrounded in previous usage? Of course not; without 
pedestrian bourgeois conventionality Surrealism could not have come 
about. Eluard’s map is a distortion, engaged for particular reasons, of a 
familiar map form. The surrealists were engaged in leveraging transfor-
mation: “Transform the world, said Marx; change life, said Rimbaud; for 
us, these two watchwords are one” [Breton, quoted in: Brotchie p.82]. 
How this distortion is materially different from the 4th century Peutinger 
Table (which was distorted to fit on its scroll) or a standard Mercator map 
(which is distorted to make rumb lines straight) or any other map is an 
issue not really addressed by Wood. It would seem likely that to address 
it he would be forced to abandon his untenable position that there is any 
difference between Eluard’s map and mine. Eluard’s map is identifiable as 
a map even by someone who would reject all Surrealist practice as illegiti-
mate. That particular someone may not accept Eluard’s map as a reason-
able characterization of the world; that is, he would not think it was a 
good map, but that particular someone would need be quite unreasonably 
doctrinaire to reject it out of hand as a map. That is because it is a map, like 
any other: like, in fact, the Vilcabamaba maps.
This is what I meant when I opined that Eluard and I made maps in the 
same way. We each identified a use for our map, and we each incorporated 
features into the map that afforded access to the information we wished 
to present, and finally (although not necessarily in that or any order) we 
framed our argument about the situation (a surrealist world, or the situ-
ation in the Andes and how best to engage it) in a manner that spoke to, 
and was acceptable to, our audience. We each constructed useful, usable, 
and trustworthy map graphics that each wear masks appropriate to them-
selves. Our practices are identical.
Setting aside for the moment the fact that Eluard and I are engaged in 
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identical practices, What can we say to Woods’ contention that the so-
called art map removes its mask, where my map must perforce remain 
masked? To answer this, I think we need first to consider the nature of the 
mask itself.
In the course of his Response, Wood gets much rolled up in Barthes’ 
terms myth and mythology, but it seems that his attention to Barthes’ 
(sometimes questionable) vocabulary and detail rather obscures some 
important points. Both Barthes and Wood seem to miss the point that all 
myth is artificial: only belief makes it seem real. The critical issue about 
myth and mythology is not that one can be invoked to “break” the other, 
nor are issues of the “alienation” engendered by myth at all pertinent. 
What is pertinent and central is that myth, and mythic structures, are 
naturalized and are believed by interpretive communities of readers (map 
users). Myth is the cultural context within which a semiotic makes sense; 
within which it has any value whatsoever. No one can possibly understand 
anything at all outside of myth. Most people simply accept that framework 
and get on with things, while others can and do recognize the structure 
as a construct, but no one can escape it because outside myth there is no 
meaning. 
It is clear that none of this is up to anyone alone. “The configuration of 
maps depends not only on the current state of geographical knowledge, 
but also on graphic codes and the visual and aesthetic universe shared by 
the author of the document and his or her readers.” (Jacobs p.184) Fur-
thermore, “the map results from a double construction, that of its author 
and that of its readers – a symmetrical process, a twofold construction as 
though reflected in a mirror, of encoding and decoding.”(Jacobs p.185). It 
happens that human cultural and mythic structures overlap, and one can, 
metaphorically, step from one to another across the world and across the 
ages. We can learn to recognize a Marshall Islands stick and shell panel as 
a map, even when we can’t use one, in very much the same way we learn 
to understand that a highway map is a map, or that a T-O map is a map . 
We learn what constitutes a legitimate map through our cultural / inter-
pretive experience, and only things so constituted can, for us, be maps. 
The features that constitute the legitimate map are the map’s mask. Until it 
is recognized, it is not a map. It is recognition of the mask that constitutes 
recognition of the map.
What, then, about the so-called Art Map? This is the map which Wood 
maintains removes its mask, to expose...... well, something (exactly what 
is never quite made clear). Let us set aside for the moment the fact that 
there is no map where there is no mask, and consider Wood’s contention 
of special privilege. 
How does one decide if a given example is an Art Map (that has ripped 
its mask away), or a regular old map (that cannot). Once again we find 
that decidability is an issue. Is it because the map was made by an artist 
instead of a cartographer? How is that status decided? How about me? 
Am I an artist or a cartographer? I am employed as a cartographer (a Chief 
Cartographer, no less); so, are my maps, by definition, not art? It happens, 
however, that I also have a Master of Fine Art degree, a terminal degree 
for an artist: I am qualified to teach in art school. My MFA thesis disserta-
tion was about maps and map-making: it was titled Cartographic Design: 
Rhetoric and Persuasion, and was published in Cartographic Perspectives 
[CP45]. I clearly have credentials as an artist; does that make my maps 
Art Maps? Maybe I need exhibitions, or maybe gallery sales, to qualify? 
(As Andy Warhol said; it’s art when the check clears). Setting aside the 
artificiality of these criteria (commercial gallery success has not been the 
benchmark of artistic value for some time now, at least since the time of 
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Corbet), I certainly have had both exhibitions and sales. I have not shown 
the Vilcabamaba maps, it is true; but I have shown and sold other maps: 
for instance, The Seven Arms of the Ota (figure 2) and The Great Grey-Green 
Greasy Limpopo River, All Set About With Fever Trees (figure 3). These works 
are maps, every bit as much maps as the Vilcabamaba maps. They are made 
in the same way; I make no differentiation in my practice. I challenge 
anyone to figure out if, under Wood’s rules, they are Art Maps or plain old 
maps. 
We could perhaps invoke issues of canon; maybe some maps are Art 
Maps because they have become recognized as such by a general (if elite) 
public. This is, after all, how one tells the difference between, say, William 
Carlos Williams’ Kora in Hell and a prescription he wrote in 1918. Late 
in life Williams identified medical case histories as having the greatest 
influence on his writing; yet while one presumes medical histories had 
almost as much influence on the prescriptions as on the prose, of the two 
examples only Kora is in the canon. 
Still, we know that both literature and the map lie in the eye of the 
beholder (the eye provided by he beholder’s interpretive community), so 
a canon is itself an unstable and shifting authority wholly dependent upon 
that same beholder’s interpretive community, which is itself mutable in 
its opinions. While a canon can help us judge the value or fashionablity 
of art, it is not a reliable guide to something as fundamental as a special 
privileging of the art map. 
Maybe the only way to tell if a map is an Art Map is to get a certificate, 
in much the same way that only documented Dogma films are Dogma. 
Still, one can get the Dogma rules from the Dogma Films web site and 
thus make a dogma-type film without a letter from Lars von Trier. Where 
are the rules for Art Maps? Does one need a letter from Denis Wood?
The point I am making here is not that maps cannot be art; the point, in 
fact, is that map making is a legitimate art practice. Although I used my-
self and my own work as examples, since Wood had already introduced 
the Vilcabamaba maps as an example, the arguments could be applied to 
any map maker. I am not claiming (at least here) that my maps are good 
art, or even that they are good maps, but I am instead drawing attention 
to the identicality of the practices. Anyone identifying a need or use for a 
map, who makes a map that is usable, and has that map accepted by an 
audience (even if that audience is limited to him or her self, in some cases) 
is engaging in an art practice called map making. Any special powers 
granted an Art Map is perforce granted to any map.
We have examined a few of the central points made by Wood in his 
“messy argument” (p.10), and found them uniformly wanting. In each 
case, Wood forwarded a special pleading as justifying privileged exis-
tences for particular categories of map, and in each case we have seen both 
that the categories are based on undecidable criteria and that the special 
privileges claimed for the particular map taxa are unwarranted. The whole 
construct breaks down on the issue of the mask all maps wear connoting 
trustworthiness, in order to solicit belief from an audience. It is clear that 
the mask is the map, and that no map is born (or even conceived) with-
out one and that no map can remove its mask (although it may switch to 
another mask for a different audience) without ceasing to be a map.
Mark Denil 
Director of Conservation Mapping / Chief Cartographer 
Center for Applied Biodiversity Science 
at Conservation International
Figure 2
Figure 3
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